Abstract: The philosophical discipline of animal ethics has been no stranger to arguments that endeavor to safeguard the rights of nonhuman animals. While many have made arguments calling for the protection of the bodily integrity and bodily liberty of animals like chimpanzees and bonobos, few have ventured to argue that such higher-order beings ought to be afforded a right to private property. In this paper, it will be my object to demonstrate that there are some animals (like dolphins) that can be understood to have property rights in their habitations consistent with Hegel’s conception of property rights. First, I will adumbrate those qualities necessary for an individual to be considered a person, or a bearer of rights, and explain how dolphins possess these necessary qualities. Secondly, I will provide a brief overview of Hegelian property rights and an in-depth argument for the way in which these rights can be viewed to apply to nonhuman persons. Then, I will spell out a distinct notion of ownerhood that will apply to a particular articulation of property rights as it is expressed by and respected in nonhuman persons. In the final section preceding this paper’s conclusion, I shall discuss what obligations these rights confer on human beings with respect to their nonhuman counterparts and why it is important that these obligations be understood as engendered by the existence of property rights rather than liberty rights.