Research

Books

Think of the Children! Toward a Just Child Welfare Policy Regime — The purpose of this book will be to offer answers to timely and provocative questions about how our political institutions should be arranged for the sake of children. I will first argue that we should embrace the principles of child-centered sufficientarianism in child welfare policy. This means that we should fashion these policies such that they promote the interests of children, not parents, to a sufficient degree. After, I will use the principles of child-centered sufficientarianism to help explain why we should embrace particular policies for children. I argue that we should:

1. Prohibit children from modifying their bodies in ways that are not medically necessary,

2. Make it easier for adults who aren’t the parents of children to be awarded visitation rights,

3. License parents,

4. Permit adults who aren’t the parents of children to abduct children from their abusive and neglectful parents in order to raise them,

5. Offer government support to those who adopt children,

6. Institute a policy of race-randomization in adoption, and

7. Allow children to take up apprenticeships in lieu of compulsory education.

This book project is in progress, and I am currently in the process of securing a contract for it.

Academic Journal Articles, Book Chapters, Etc.

Reciprocity of the Oppressed (forthcoming in Social Theory and Practice) — I argue that certain special obligations members of certain marginalized groups have to one another, if any such obligations exist, cannot be explained in terms of reciprocity. First, I motivate reciprocity of the oppressed (RO)––the term I’ve coined for the view that members of a particular marginalized social group have special obligations, corresponding to perfect duties, to one another grounded in reciprocity. Then, I argue that RO can, at most, generate special obligations, corresponding to imperfect duties, for members of certain marginalized groups. After, I clarify what sorts of obligations reciprocity could generate for members of certain marginalized groups and, in doing so, show that RO can vindicate only modest conclusions about the duties that members of a marginalized group have to one another.

Citation: TBD.

Should You Stick Around? Children’s Associational Rights and the Duties of Nonparental Caregivers (forthcoming in The Journal of Ethics) — Many believe that it is wrong for parents to prevent their children from associating with other adults. Many also believe that it is wrong for parents to prevent their children from continuing to associate with adults whose association with them is crucial to the children’s well-being. Call these adults the important associates of children. In this essay, I will argue that the considerations favoring the two judgments just mentioned also favor a further judgment. In particular, I will argue that important associates are presumptively obligated to continue associating with the children to whom they are important associates. This means that the important associates of children who dissolve their association with a child without proper justification wrong these children by doing so.

Citation: Kianpour, C.K. (2024). “Should You Stick Around? Children’s Associational Rights and the Duties of Nonparental Caregivers.” The Journal of Ethics. Advance article.

Defensive Kidnapping (Moral Philosophy and Politics 2024) — Are private citizens ever morally permitted to abduct children and keep them in their custody, to protect them from their severely abusive or neglectful parents? Should private citizens face legal penalties for abducting children and keeping them in their custody, to protect them from their severely abusive or neglectful parents? In this essay, I offer arguments that support an affirmative answer to the first question and a negative answer to the second. Ultimately, I come out supporting a legal regime that keeps what I call defensive kidnapping illegal, but in which public officials may use discretion when enforcing laws that criminalize kidnapping. Under such a regime, children who were severely abused or neglected by their parents but saved by a loving, capable private citizen would be spared from admission into the precarity of the child welfare system.

Citation: Kianpour, C.K. (2024). “Defensive Kidnapping.” Moral Philosophy and Politics. Advance article.

The Kids Aren’t Alright: Expanding the Role of the State in Parenting (Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 2023) — I first defend the claim that forms of regulated parenting are presumptively justified whereas private parenting is not. Then, I argue that the reasons we have to believe that regulated parenting is justified are likewise reasons to believe that individuals who are objectionably intolerant—that is, they subscribe to prejudicial dogmas such as racism, sexism, and homophobia to such an extent that their ability to direct caring attitudes toward, for example, Black people, women, and/or gay people is significantly impaired—ought not to rear children. Finally, I argue that if these people ought not rear children, we have special reason to institute a scheme of parental licensing to ensure they do not.

Citation: Kianpour, C.K. (2023). “The Kids Aren’t Alright: Expanding the Role of the State in Parenting.” Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 25(3), pp. 431–463.

The Political Speech Rights of the Tokenized (Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 2023) — It is important for members of marginalized groups to express political views relevant to how members of their respective groups should be treated. Recently, however, it has been argued that there are some contexts––that is, contexts in which members of marginalized groups are tokenized and have considerable power to influence political outcomes that would affect their other group members––in which certain marginalized group members ought not express certain political views relevant to how members of their respective groups should be treated. In this essay, I examine two arguments defending this conclusion (the proportional representation and unjust enrichment arguments) and conclude that both fail. Then, I argue that recognizing that members of marginalized groups are permitted to speak their minds, even in these contexts, favorably affirms their broad political speech rights.

Citation: Kianpour, C.K. (2023). “The Political Speech Rights of the Tokenized.” Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy. Advance article.

Strong Comic Immoralism (The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 2023) — Strong comic immoralism maintains that every time a humorous demonstration (e.g., a joke) involves a moral defect, it is enhanced aesthetically in virtue of having this moral defect. I want to show that strong comic immoralism is a coherent position that it is possible to defend and that there is, in fact, some reason to defend it. By doing this, my hope is that, moving forward, those who are interested in questions about the relationship between immorality and the aesthetic value of jokes will take more seriously the objections that may be presented against their views by the strong comic immoralist, rather than claiming that “no one on this side of Satan” would be one.

Citation: Kianpour, C.K. (2023). “Strong Comic Immoralism.” The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 81(3), pp. 363–377.

The Minority Retort: In Defense of Defection in Marginalized Groups (Public Affairs Quarterly 2022) — The defection thesis holds that members of marginalized social groups are obligated not to express views important to others in the group which are regarded by the others as substantively wrong. In this essay, I evaluate arguments that seek to vindicate the defection thesis and conclude they all fail. Then, I argue that we have reason to believe sanctioning defectors in certain ways is wrongful and that the expression of their contentious ideas is good for members of marginalized groups. We are left to conclude both that marginalized people have no obligation to suppress their heterodox views, and that it is likely wrong to sanction them for expressing these views even if it were wrong for them to do so.

Citation: Kianpour, C.K. (2022). “The Minority Retort: In Defense of Defection in Marginalized Groups.” Public Affairs Quarterly 36(4), pp. 280–311.

It Only Affects Me: Pharmaceutical Regulation and Harm to Others (HEC Forum 2022) — In her Pharmaceutical Freedom, Jessica Flanigan argues that antibiotics can be regulated consistent with her otherwise largely deregulatory view with respect to pharmaceuticals and recreational drugs. I contend in this essay that the reasons for justifying antibiotic regulation are reasons that can be offered to justify the regulation of many other drugs, both pharmaceutical and recreational. After laying out the specifics of Flanigan’s view, I suggest that it is amenable to the regulation of drugs like varenicline. Though such drugs can legitimately improve the quality of a patient’s life by helping them quit smoking, they could be permissibly regulated if they expose others to impermissible risks. I then argue that recreational drugs like alcohol could be regulated using the same reasoning. In the penultimate section of this essay, I anticipate objections that one might have to my extension of arguments favoring antibiotic regulation to drugs correlated with aggression. Flanigan might find my extrapolation of her view as entirely plausible and accept that her view is relatively friendly to these regulations, or she might reconsider her antibiotic caveat if these regulations are overly paternalistic on her understanding. I conclude by superficially considering the benefits and drawbacks of adopting each view.

Citation: Kianpour, C.K. (2022). “It Only Affects Me: Pharmaceutical Freedom and Harm to Others.” HEC Forum 34, pp. 269–289.

Red in Tooth and Claw No More: Animal Rights and the Permissibility to Redesign Nature, with Eze Paez (Environmental Values 2022) — Most nonhuman animals live in the wild and it is probable that suffering predominates in their lives due to natural events. Humans may at some point be able to engage in paradise engineering, or the modification of nature and animal organisms themselves to improve the well-being of wild animals. We may, in other words, make nature “red in tooth and claw” no more. We argue that this creates a tension between environmental ethics and animal ethics which is likely insurmountable. First, we argue that concern for the environment can be compatible with helping individual wild animals but should see redesigning nature as morally impermissible. Second, we argue that if we are concerned with animal well-being, we may reject that we have a duty to help wild animals even to the point of redesigning nature, but we must nevertheless concede that it is permissible to do so under certain circumstances. We show how this permissibility can be derived from three animal rights views: Tom Regan’s, a novel account inspired by Thomas Pogge, and a libertarian approach to animal rights.

Citation: Kianpour, C.K., and E. Paez. (2022). “Red in Tooth and Claw No More: Animal Rights and the Permissibility to Redesign Nature.” Environmental Values 31(2), pp. 211–231.

It’s Still Funny Though: A Defense of Moderate Comic Immoralism, in It’s Funny ‘Cause It’s True (2021) — In this chapter, I defend a version of moderate comic immoralism. According to this view, sometimes jokes are made funnier because they are immoral. Moderate comic immoralism, on its face, is much more plausible, intuitive, and defensible than strong comic immoralism. All that is required to show that moderate comic immoralism is true is a single instance in which a joke is made funnier because it is immoral. Since I am an overachiever, I will provide two examples in which jokes are made more amusing because they are immoral and explain why their amusement is enhanced specifically by their immorality. In due course, I anticipate some objections to moderate comic immoralism and put them to rest. By the end of this chapter, you will be able to justify your belief in what you already knew to be true about the relationship between immorality and funniness. You’re welcome.

Citation: Kianpour, C.K. (2021). “It’s Still Funny Though: A Defense of Moderate Comic Immoralism.” In It’s Funny ‘Cause It’s True: The Lighthearted Philosophers’ Society’s Introduction to Philosophy Through Humor. Edited by J.M. Henrigillis and S. Gimbel. The Lighthearted Philosophers’ Society, pp. 166–173.

Cetacean Property: A Hegelish Account of Nonhuman Property Rights (Politics and Animals 2020) — First, I spell out the details of a Hegelish conception of property. To clarify what makes this account unique, I compare it against a labor-mixing conception of property that finds its origins in Locke. In doing so, I highlight strengths of a Hegelish account of property over its Lockean alternative. Then, I show how dolphins, consistent with a Hegelish account of property, are property owners of their oceanic habitats. Finally, I outline the strengths of a Hegelish account of property as it would apply to dolphins and perhaps other nonhuman animals in protecting them. It is not my aim to argue that a Hegelish account of nonhuman property is the only viable path toward recognizing nonhuman property. Rather, I hope to show that such an account holds promise as a tool in the conceptual toolbox handled by theorists of the political turn in animal ethics.

Citation: Kianpour, C.K. (2020). “Cetacean Property: A Hegelish Account of Nonhuman Property Rights.” Politics and Animals 6(1), pp. 23–36.

How Federal Policy Puts Eating Disorder Sufferers At Risk, with Michelle Minton (Competitive Enterprise Institute 2020) — This paper details the threat that one-size-fits-all nutritional policies pose to individuals with restrictive eating disorders and how moving toward more individualized nutritional advice can benefit not only those with restrictive eating disorders, but also the whole nation. First, it discusses the nature and consequences of restrictive eating disorders. It then provides an overview of the ways in which certain nutritional policies may affect individuals with these conditions. Finally, it proposes steps that government agencies can take to institute individualized nutritional care that would benefit the health of the general public and improve outcomes for those with eating disorders.

Citation: Minton, M., and C.K. Kianpour (2020). “How Federal Policy Puts Eating Disorder Sufferers at Risk: Dietary Guidelines for Americans and Affordable Care Act Menu Labeling Rules Fail to Take Vulnerable Population into Account.” Issue Analysis 2020 No. 1, Competitive Enterprise Institute. 11 March 2020. <https://cei.org/content/how-federal-policy-puts-eating-disorder-sufferers-risk>

Breaking Boundaries: An Investigation of Libertarian Open Borders (Journal of Libertarian Studies 2019) — I will first offer a general understanding of the flavor of libertarianism I will be using as the foundation for my argument for open borders. Then, I will summarize the argument put forth by Joseph Carens (1987) which consummates the importance of open border policy in maintaining the efficacy of property rights. After, I will supplement an additional argument to Carens’s in order to strengthen it. In this section, I will interpret Robert Nozick’s Anarchy, State, and Utopia (1974) such that it informs the importance of the enforcement of a right of free movement, and I will furthermore detail how border restrictions directly violate that right. In the final section of this paper, I will address criticisms made both by libertarian and liberal thinkers against the enforcement of a right of free movement. One of the liberal criticisms, in particular, will serve as a jumping-off point for a conversation highlighting the ways in which libertarian arguments for open borders differ from liberal arguments for open borders. These differences, I contend, illuminate how disparate these philosophical traditions are, especially in the manner that they conceive of rights.

Citation: Kianpour, C.K. (2019). “Breaking Boundaries: An Investigation of Libertarian Open Borders.” Journal of Libertarian Studies 23, pp. 39–63.

Book Reviews

Review of Wendy Salkin’s Speaking for Others: The Ethics of Informal Political Representation. Accepted for publication in Journal of Moral Philosophy.

Works-In-Progress

1. A paper, under consideration, that argues that liberals may coherently and plausibly subscribe to the view that the state may promote sex exceptionalism.

2. A paper, under consideration, that argues that considerations of solidarity cannot ground special obligations among members of an oppressed group.

3. A paper, under consideration, that argues that epistemic privilege cannot explain why members of the same oppressed group have an obligation to engage in some kinds of activism rather than others.

4. A paper, under consideration, about the ethics and politics of pediatric gender medicine.

5. Rejecting the Categories: Agender and Aracial Identities — A paper/chapter, coauthored with Nathan Halloween, about how the reasons we have to accept agender identity are likewise reasons to accept aracial identities. In progress.

6. Parenting a Transracial Child — A chapter for a multidisciplinary collection on transraciality about how philosophical discussions about parenting homosexuals and transgender individuals enriches our understanding of how we should parent transracial individuals. In progress.

7. Colorblindness, Vindicated (winner of the Jentzsch Prize at CU Boulder) — I consider different interpretations of the sociopolitical ideals of colorblindness and color consciousness, and defend my own interpretation against competing views. Then, I argue that we should presume the truth of colorblindness in the absence of good reasons to think that color consciousness is true. After, I show how there are no good reasons to think that color consciousness is true. Finally, I spell out some implications of accepting the truth of colorblindness as a vision of egalitarian justice. Draft available upon request. [dissertation chapter]

8. Valuing Humanoid Beauty Too Much — In this article, I offer a novel ethical objection to the selling (and gifting) of sex robots. This objection is distinct from objections that have so far been made about the ethics of sex robots because it locates the wrong of selling (and gifting) sex robots in how the sale (and gifting) of sex robots institutionalizes oppressive standards of beauty in a particularly pernicious way. I first make clear the assumptions on which my objection rests. Then, I raise the objection. And prior to concluding, I address objections someone might raise against my view. Working draft available upon request.

9. The Sexual Liberalism of Fear — Sex exceptionalism is the view that sex is to be evaluated in morally different terms than other activities. Some liberal-minded thinkers have suggested that liberal principles entail a version of sex exceptionalism. But there are two very different liberal visions of what makes sex morally different from other activities: the sexual liberalism of opportunity and the sexual liberalism of fear. In this essay, I explicate what distinguishes these two visions of sex exceptionalism and argue that the sexual liberalism of fear is preferable to the sexual liberalism of opportunity. An implication of my arguments is that there should be a strong moral presumption in favor of monogamy in liberal societies that affirm sex exceptionalism. In progress.

10. Fantasy, Free Conscience, and “Conservative” Sexual Mores in Liberal Society — First, I argue that it is important for cultural norms that protect important liberal values to be embraced in liberal society, even if these norms are not instantiated by the state. Then, I argue that we should embrace what some take to be “conservative” cultural norms around sex because they protect the liberal value of free conscience. Finally, I clarify the limits of my argument and spell out what I take to be its most important implications. In progress.

11. A Liberal Argument Against Mandatory Calorie Labels — First, I argue that arguments in defense of mandatory calorie labeling also support a caloric information disclosure regime in which food producers are required to make caloric information about their food products publicly available, perhaps by contributing to a public access federal database that collects caloric information about food products, rather than by specifically posting calorie labels on food products. Then, I argue that there are important cases in which making caloric information known to individuals might discourage them from making choices that promote their health: cases involving people with certain restrictive eating disorders, and cases involving fat individuals regardless of whether or not they struggle with a binge eating disorder. If this is true, then we have a powerful reason to prefer the database model of caloric information disclosure to the labeling model of caloric information disclosure. The database model allows those with restrictive eating disorders and those who are fat to make choices that promote their health, whereas the labeling model would hinder those with restrictive eating disorders and those who are fat from making choices that promote their health. Then, I gesture to some other policies that states could adopt, consistent with my preceding arguments, that would likely empower those with restrictive eating disorders and those who are fat from making poor health choices. Prior to concluding, I argue that disclosure of caloric information is not necessary for consumers to give informed consent when purchasing food products. This would mean that for those who think the disclosure of caloric information is necessary only to empower consumers to give informed consent when purchasing food products, there would be no grounds for supporting either the database model or labeling model of caloric information disclosure. My hope is to show that mandatory calorie labeling practices are not only unnecessary for the state to engage in, but that the state’s doing so is also positively bad. In progress.

12. Comic (Im)moralism, Error Detection, and the Problem of Immoral Jokes — In this essay, I offer a new solution to what I call “the problem of immoral jokes.” As I understand it, the problem is that there are some jokes that appear problematic to say or enjoy––so what should we do in light of this? The consensus in the philosophical literature on humor is that we should avoid telling and enjoying these jokes. But I think, oddly enough, that the fact that these jokes appear problematic in the ways they do provide us with reason to tell and enjoy these jokes. Specifically, I think that the fact that these jokes appear problematic in the ways they do provide us with reason to think these jokes are a source of moral education: we learn about what is just and unjust, proprietous and improprietous, from so-called “immoral jokes.” Rather than thinking that the seemingly problematic features of immoral jokes require us not to tell and enjoy them, we might think that they actually prescribe telling and enjoying these jokes with a view toward entrenching valuable moral norms. And this is precisely what I think, and what I will convince you, the reader, of in this essay. In progress.