What I'm Reading (08/2019)
I hope to share with those interested works that I have come across that have piqued my interest as a libertarian, animal ethicist, or both. If, based on my current reading list, you have recommendations for me––by all means, let me know! I am always eager to dive into something new.
“Wild Animals as Political Subjects” by John Hadley. Abstract: “In what follows, the expression ‘political subject’ means something akin to citizen or, at least,legitimate stakeholder. To be a political subject is to have a certain status within a nation state. To have status ordinarily means that the state must provide you with certain goods. Goods can take the form of rights or interest protections. Ideally, rights and interest protections are legally enshrined guarantees. In effect, to be a political subject is to have a stake in the laws and institutions that serve to regulate dealings between citizens. Basically, being a political subject means that you are on the radar, so to speak. Should wild nonhuman animals (hereafter, animals) be on the political radar? I will begin by examining a possible negative answer to that question. I will then use the question to frame an examination of how a number of influential political theories may be applied to animals.The conclusion is that, like so many philosophical questions concerning animals, answers to the political subject question turn importantly upon facts about the psychological capacities of the animals themselves.”
“Chewing over in vitro meat: Animal ethics, cannibalism, and social progress” by Josh Milburn. Abstract: “Despite its potential for radically reducing the harm inflicted on nonhuman animals in the pursuit of food, there are a number of objections grounded in animal ethics to the development of in vitro meat. In this paper, I defend the possibility against three such concerns. I suggest that worries about reinforcing ideas of flesh as food and worries about the use of nonhuman animals in the production of in vitro meat can be overcome through appropriate safeguards and a fuller understanding of the interests that nonhuman animals actually possess. Worries about the technology reifying speciesist hierarchies of value are more troublesome, however. In response to this final challenge, I suggest that we should be open not just to the production of in vitro nonhuman flesh, but also in vitro human flesh. This leads to a consideration of the ethics of cannibalism. The paper ultimately defends the position that cannibalism simpliciter is not morally problematic, though a great many practices typically associated with it are. The consumption of in vitro human flesh, however, is able to avoid these problematic practices, and so should be considered permissible. I conclude that animal ethicists and vegans should be willing to cautiously embrace the production of in vitro flesh.”
“Robert Nozick on nonhuman animals: Rights, value and the meaning of life" by Josh Milburn. Abstract: “In his chapter, Josh Milburn argues that Robert Nozick considers nonhuman animals in his philosophical writings, but that these discussions are downplayed in animal ethics and Nozick scholarship. This is regrettable, Milburn proposes, as Nozick is far more sympathetic to animal rights than many other libertarians. Milburn thus offers an analysis of Nozick’s animal ethics. Nozick’s arguments concerning vegetarianism and speciesism are considered, and Milburn argues that tensions in Nozick’s political philosophy potentially open the door to animal rights. Whatever their place in his political philosophy, Milburn contends, nonhuman animals find a comfortable home in Nozick’s axiology and ethics, with their value and the significance of our duties towards them affirmed. Milburn concludes that animal ethicists could learn from Nozick’s distinctive arguments and approaches and find an unexpected ally.”
“Nonhuman animals as property-holders: An exploration of the Lockean labor-mixing account” by Josh Milburn. Abstract: “Recent proposals in political philosophy concerning nonhuman animals as property-holders – from John Hadley and Steve Cooke – have focussed on the interests that nonhuman animals have in access to and use of their territories. The possibility that such rights might be grounded on the basis of a Lockean (that is, labour-mixing) account of property has been rejected. In this paper, I explore four criticisms of Lockean property rights for nonhuman animals – concerning self-ownership, initiative, exertion and the sufficiency of protection offered – concluding that Lockean property rights could be extended to nonhuman animals. I then suggest that Lockean property rights actually offer advantages over interest-based accounts: they more clearly ground property, they are potentially broader, and they are considerably stronger.”
(I have absolutely delighted in reading the works of Josh Milburn as of late. His writing is incisive, thoughtful, and thorough. If you are looking for a gripping introduction to the political turn in animal ethics and want to understand how a normative study of animals might affect human interrelation, I highly recommend reading the in vitro meat piece. It is one of those academic pieces that I simply could not stop reading once I started.)
“Innocent Threats and the Moral Problem of Carnivorous Animals” by Rainer Ebert and Tibor Machan. Abstract: “The existence of predatory animals is a problem in animal ethics that is often not taken as seriously as it should be. We show that it reveals a weakness in Tom Regan’s theory of animal rights that also becomes apparent in his treatment of innocent human threats. We show that there are cases in which Regan’s justice-prevails-approach to morality implies a duty not to assist the jeopardized, contrary to his own moral beliefs. While a modified account of animal rights that recognizes the moral patient as a kind of entity that can violate moral rights avoids this counterintuitive conclusion, it makes non-human predation a rights issue that morally ought to be subjected to human regulation. Jennifer Everett, Lori Gruen and other animal advocates base their treatment of predation in part on Regan’s theory and run into similar problems,demonstrating the need to radically rethink the foundations of the animal rights movement. We suggest to those who, like us, find it less plausible to introduce morality to the wild than to reject the concept of rights that makes this move necessary to read our criticism either as a modus tollens argument and reject non-human animal rights altogether or as motivating a libertarian-ish theory of animal rights.”
“Do Animals Need Citizenship?” by William A. Edmundson. Abstract: “An ambitious proposal by Sue Donaldson and Will Kymlicka seeks to break out of an impasse that animal-rights advocacy seems to have reached. They divide the animal kingdom into three categories and distribute rights accordingly. Domesticated animals are to be treated as citizens, enjoying the same rights and duties as human citizens (adjusting for relevant differences in ability, just as we do for children and the severely cognitively handicapped). Wild animal species are to be treated as sovereign nations having rights to their territories Liminal animals are to be treated as resident aliens. This article is a critique of this “Citizenship Theory” of animal rights. One theme of the critique questions whether citizenship and sovereignty are in fact doing the normative work that Citizenship Theory represents them as doing. Another theme questions whether rights of citizenship and sovereignty can be of use to the animals Citizenship Theory would bestow them on.”
“Having Too Much” by Ingrid Robeyns. Abstract: “This paper defends the limitarian doctrine, which entails the view that it is morally objectionable to be rich. I examine how limitarianism can be spelled out and whether it can be convincingly defended. As is the case with egalitarianism and other distributive views, one can distinguish between intrinsic limitarianism and non-intrinsic limitarianism; and a variety of justifications can be explored. I defend non-intrinsic limitarianism based on two different arguments: the democratic argument and the argument from unmet urgent needs. An account of what ‘riches’ entails is also developed, since any plausible account of limitarianism requires a sufficiently clear account of the threshold. I also discuss whether limitarianism should be defended as a moral or rather as a political doctrine. Finally, I analyze and reject two important objections, claiming that limitarianism violates equality of opportunities and that limitarianism does not take incentive considerations into account. The paper concludes with an outline of a future research agenda on limitarianism.”
“Exploitation and Consent” by Matt Zwolinski. Abstract: “To exploit someone is to take unfair advantage of their vulnerability or weakness. But are exploitative interactions necessarily non-consensual? This essay explores the relationship between exploitation and consent, and argues that exploitative exchanges need not involve any defect in consent. Nor do defects in consent such as coercion or ignorance necessarily render an interaction wrongfully exploitative. Defects in consent are thus neither necessary nor sufficient for exploitation, though they may be relevant in determining its moral weight and moral force.”
“‘The Kids Are Alright’: Political Liberalism, Leisure Time, and Childhood” by Blain Neufeld. Abstract: “Interest in the nature and importance of 'childhood goods' recently has emerged within philosophy. Childhood goods, roughly, are things (including kinds of activities) that are good for persons qua children independent of any contribution to the good of persons qua adults (although they may also be valuable in this way). According to Colin Macleod, John Rawls's political conception of justice as fairness rests upon an adult-centered 'agency assumption' and thus is incapable of incorporating childhood goods into its content. Macleod concludes that because of this, justice as fairness cannot be regarded as a complete conception of distributive justice. In this paper I provide a political liberal response to Macleod's argument by advancing three claims. First, I propose that political liberalism should treat leisure time as a distinct 'primary good.' Second, I suggest that leisure time should be distributed via (a) the 'basic needs principle' and (b) the 'difference principle' for all citizens over the course of their complete lives, including their childhoods. Third, the provision of leisure time in this way supports the realization of childhood goods for citizens.”